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Abstract 
We  formulate  four  alternative  Bayesian  models  of  causal 
strength judgments, and compare their predictions to two sets of 
human data. The models were derived by factorially varying the 
generating function for integrating multiple causes (based on 
either  the  power  PC  theory  or  the  ∆P  rule)  and  priors  on 
strengths  (favoring  necessary  and  sufficient  (NS)  causes,  or 
uniform). The models based on the power generating function 
provided  much  better  fits  than  those  based  on  the  linear 
function.  The  models  that  included  NS  priors  were  able  to 
account for subtle asymmetries between strength judgments for 
generative and preventive causes. 
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Strength Judgments in a Bayesian Framework 
Humans  and  other  animals  are  able  to  use  contingency 
information  to  judge  the  potency  of  a  cause  that  acts  to 
produce or prevent an associated effect. For example, the 
HIV  virus  almost  always  leads  to  development  of  the 
disease  AIDS  (high  causal  strength),  whereas  smoking  a 
pack of cigarette every day for a year leads to cancer with 
some small probability (low causal strength). In the simplest 
possible causal situation, a single binary candidate cause, C, 
varies  along  with  a  binary  effect,  E,  against  a  constant 
background, B, that also might produce E (Figure 1). We 
assume B and C occur prior to E. The available contingency 
data takes the form of a tally of the frequencies with which 
E does or does not occur in the presence of either B alone 
(base rate of the effect) or B and C together. How can such 
contingency  information  be  translated  into  an  estimate  of 
the causal strength of C? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judging causal strength can be formalized as a Bayesian 
problem of parameter estimation within a fixed causal graph 
as shown in Figure 1 (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005; Jaynes, 
2003). Within the Bayesian framework, inference depends 
jointly  on  the  likelihoods  of  data  given  alternative 
hypotheses,  and  on  priors  for  these  hypotheses.    For 
strength  judgments,  likelihoods  depend  on  the  causal 
generating function, i.e., how do the influences of potential 
causes B and C in Graph 1 combine to influence E? The 
relevant priors are initial probabilities assigned to possible 
values  of  the  weights  wo  and  w1  (representing  causal 
strengths) on the causal links for B and C, respectively. 
Derivation of Bayesian Models 
Based  on  observation  of  contingency  data  D,  a  Bayesian 
model  can  be  formalized  to  infer  causal  strength.    The 
Bayesian model is able to assess the probability distribution 
of  w1 so as to quantify statistical properties of the causal 
strength of candidate cause C to produce or prevent E. In 
this paper we compare the average human strength rating 
with the mean of w1 in the causal structure shown in Figure 
1.  The mean of w1 is determined by  
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where  ) , | ( 1 0 w w D P  is  the  likelihood  term.  ) , ( 1 0 w w P  
corresponds to prior probabilities that model the learner’s 
beliefs  about  the  values  of  causal  strengths.  P(D)  is  the 
normalizing term, denoting the probability of obtaining the 
observed data.  Let  − + /  indicate the value of the variable 
to  be  1  (present)  versus  0  (absent).    The  likelihood  term 
) , | ( 1 0 w w D P  is given by 
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Figure 1. A simple causal graph. 
B, C, and E are binary variables.  
Weights  w0  and  w1  in  Graph  1 
indicate  causal  strength  of  the 
background  cause,  B,  and  the 
candidate cause, C, respectively.    ∏ 
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 where  } 1 , 0 { , , ∈ e c b  denotes the absence and the presence 
of the causes B, C, and the effect E. 
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n  denotes the number 
of  ways  of  picking  k  unordered  outcomes  from  n 
possibilities. 
 
Alternative  Generating  Functions  Griffiths  and 
Tenenbaum  (2005)  pointed  out  that  Bayesian  models  of 
causal  judgments  can  be  constructed  using  either  of  two 
generating  functions  derived  from  models  in  the 
psychological literature. The generating function adopted by 
Griffiths and Tenenbaum in their “causal support” model is 
the power generating function, derived from the power PC 
theory (Cheng, 1997; see Glymour, 2001). For the situation 
in  which  background  cause  B  and  candidate  cause  C  are 
both  potential  generative  causes,  the  probability  of 
observing the effect E is given by a noisy-OR function, 
P(e
+ |b,c;w0,w1) = w0b+ w1c − w0w1bc.       (4) 
It is assumed that b=1 because the background cause B is 
always present in the experimental setup. In the preventive 
case,  B  is  again  assumed  to  be  potentially  generative 
(following  the  power  PC  theory,  which  specifies  that  the 
background must not include preventive causes), whereas C 
is  potentially  preventive.  The  resulting  noisy-AND-NOT 
generating function for preventive causes is 
. ) , ; , | ( 1 0 0 1 0 bc w w b w w w c b e P − =
+          (5) 
For convenience we will refer to Eqs. 4-5 together as the 
power  generating  function.  Because  the  power  generating 
function obeys the laws of probability, the weights w0 and 
w1 are inherently constrained to the range [0,1]. 
Using  the  power  generating  function,  Cheng  (1997) 
derived  quantitative  predictions  for  judgments  of  causal 
strength. Let q represent a point estimate of the value of 
causal power. When certain assumptions are satisfied, the 
predicted value of causal power for a generative cause is 
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and the predicted value of power for a preventive cause is 
qP =
−∆P
P(e
+ |c
−)
 ,                                      (7) 
where ∆P is simply the difference between the probability 
of the effect in the presence versus absence of the candidate 
cause, i.e., 
         ∆P = P(e
+ |c
+)− P(e
+ |c
−).                  (8) 
Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2005) showed that causal power 
(q  in  Eqs.  6-7)  corresponds  to  the  maximum  likelihood 
estimate for the random variable w1 on a fixed graph (as 
shown in Figure 1) under the power generating function. 
The  term  P(e
+ |c
−) in  the  denominator  of  Eqs.  6-7  is 
often  termed  the  base  rate  of  the  effect,  as  it  gives  the 
prevalence of the effect under background conditions in the 
absence of the candidate cause. The base rate determines the 
value of w0 in the causal structural graph shown in Figure 1. 
Note  that  the  derivation  of  causal  power  for  generative 
causes (Eqs. 4, 6) versus preventive causes (Eqs. 5, 7) is 
inherently asymmetrical with respect to the base rate of the 
effect.  
An alternative generating function can be derived directly 
from  ∆P  (Eq.  8),  which  has  been  interpreted  by  some 
theorists as an estimate of causal strength (Jenkins & Ward, 
1965).  Under  certain  conditions,  when  learning  is  at 
asymptote the ∆P rule is equivalent to the Rescorla-Wagner 
associative  learning  model  (see  Danks,  2003),  which  has 
been advanced as a model of causal inference (Shanks & 
Dickinson, 1987). The ∆P model yields a linear generating 
function, 
P(e
+ |b,c;w0,w1) = w0b+ w1c              (9) 
where w0  is within the range [0,1], and  w1  is within the 
range [-1,1] and with an additional constraint that w0 + w1 
must lie in the range [0,1] so as to result in a legitimate 
probability  distribution.    Eq.  9  simply  states  that  the 
candidate cause C changes the probability of E by a constant 
amount  regardless  of  the  presence  or  absence  of  other 
causes, such as B.  Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2005) proved 
that Eq. 9 yields ∆P as the maximum likelihood estimate of 
w1 when substituted for Eqs. 4-5.  
 
Alternative Priors The second component in Eq. 2 is the 
prior  on  causal  strength,  ) , ( 1 0 w w P ,  within  the  causal 
structure  in  Figure  1.  When  C  is  an  unfamiliar  cause,  a 
natural assumption is that people will have no substantive 
priors about the values of w0 and w1, modeled by priors that 
are uniform over the range [0,1]. Griffiths and Tenenbaum 
(2005) adopted uniform priors in their causal support model. 
An  alternative  proposal  is  that  people  have  priors  for 
necessary and sufficient (NS) causes (Lu et al., 2006). Our 
NS power model integrates the power generating function 
with  generic  priors  (cf.  Lu  &  Yuille,  2006)  about  the 
relationship  between  the  powers  of  alternative  potential 
causes. We make the assumption that people prefer causal 
networks that are relatively simple (Novick & Cheng, 2004, 
p. 471) and that people have a deterministic bias regarding 
causal strength. Causal simplicity (Chater & Vitányi, 2003) 
potentially manifests itself in multiple  ways, which likely 
include a preference for fewer causes (Lombrozo, 2007) and 
for causes that do not involve interactions (Novick & Cheng, 
2004; Liljeholm  & Cheng, in press). Deterministic causal 
preference  biases  causal  strength  towards  0  and/or  1.  NS 
priors imply that people have a prior belief favoring causes 
that are necessary and sufficient (e.g., a genetic defect on 
chromosome  4  is  necessary  and  sufficient  to  cause 
Huntington’s disease). But rather than being a strict logical 
condition, NS priors are assumed to be probabilistic. Pearl 
(2000)  interpreted  generative  causal  power  (Eq.  3)  as 
“probability of sufficiency,” and ∆P (Eq. 6) as “probability 
of  necessity  and  sufficiency.”  (For  preventive  causes  the 
analogous quantities are preventive causal power and −∆P, 
respectively.) Developmental data provide support for the assumption  of  NS  priors.  Recent  evidence  indicates  that 
preschool children tacitly believe in “causal determinism”, 
inferring unobserved causes to explain apparently stochastic 
patterns of effects (Schultz & Sommerville, 2006). 
For the generative case, the background B and candidate 
C are both potentially generative, and hence will implicitly 
compete  as  alternative  NS  causes.  Accordingly,  we  set 
priors  favoring  NS  generative  causes  with  the  prior 
distribution peaks for  0 w ,  1 w  at 0,1 (C is an NS cause) and 
1,0 (B is) (see Figure 2A). We specify the priors using a 
mixed distribution with exponential functions, 
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where α  is a parameter controlling how strongly necessary 
and sufficient causes are preferred. When  0 = α , the prior 
follows a uniform distribution, indicating no preference to 
any values of causal strength.  2 2 / ) 1 ( 2 ) ( α α
α − − = e Z  denotes a 
normalization  term  that  ensures  the  sum  of  the  prior 
probabilities  equals  1.  Figure  2A  depicts  the  shape  of  a 
distribution when α = 5.  
 
Figure 2. Prior distributions over w0 and w1 with NS priors. A: 
Generative case,  5 = α  (peaks at 0,1 and 1,0); B: Preventive case, 
5 = α  (peaks at 1,1 and 1,0). 
The NS prior will differ for the preventive case (Figure 
2B). Because  the  background  cause,  B,  is  assumed  to  be 
generative  regardless  of  the  existence  of  the  preventive 
candidate cause C, B and C will not compete as alternative 
NS causes in the preventive case. The issue of prevention 
will  arise  under  the  assumption  that  the  effect  is  being 
generated; hence the peak weight of w0 for the background 
cause B (the only possible generative cause) is assumed to 
be biased towards 1. The maximum probability of necessity 
and sufficiency for C as a preventer will then obtain when B 
is  a  sufficient  generative  cause,  1 0 = w ,  yielding  a 
distribution peak for  0 w ,  1 w  at 1,1. If C is not sufficient, 
the alternative consistent with causal determinism is that it 
is completely ineffective, yielding an additional peak at 1,0. 
We again use an exponential formulation,  
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where all parameters are defined as in Eq. 10. 
Note  that  the  two  peaks  of  the  NS  priors  for  the 
preventive case (Figure 2B) are not symmetrical with those 
for  the  generative  case  (Figure  2A).  As  we  will  see,  the 
asymmetrical  NS  priors  for  generative  versus  preventive 
causes  yield  systematic  asymmetries  in  human  causal 
judgments as a function of causal direction. 
In summary, the factorial combination of two alternative 
generating  functions  (power  versus  linear)  and  two 
alternative  priors  (NS  or  uniform)  yields  four  alternative 
Bayesian models: Model I (power, NS), Model II (power, 
uniform),  Model  III  (linear,  NS),  and  Model  IV  (linear, 
uniform). Model I corresponds to the NS power model (Lu 
et  al.,  2006)  when  adapted  to  estimate  causal  strength. 
Model II corresponds to the causal support model (Griffiths 
&  Tenenbaum,  2005)  when  adapted  to  estimate  strength 
(Danks,  Griffiths  &  Tenenbaum,  2003).  Model  IV 
corresponds  to  a  Bayesian  formulation  of  the  ∆P  rule 
(Jenkins & Ward, 1965) and the equivalent variant of the 
Rescorla-Wagner model (e.g., Shanks & Dickinson, 1987). 
Model III, identical to Model IV except with NS priors, has 
never been previously considered. 
Simulations of Human Strength Judgments 
We tested these four models by comparing the predictions 
of  each  for  two  data  sets  of  human  judgments  of  causal 
strength. Methodological issues arise in selecting data for 
quantitative modeling of strength judgments. Many studies 
have used rating scales to assess causal strength. As pointed 
out by Buehner et al. (2003), such scales may be ambiguous, 
leading participants to give responses that conflate causal 
strength  with  reliability.  An  elicitation  procedure  for 
strength  judgments  that  minimizes  ambiguity  is  to  ask 
participants  to  estimate  the  frequency  with  which  the 
candidate cause would produce (or prevent) the effect in a 
new  set  of  cases  that  do  not  already  exhibit  the  effect 
(Buehner et al., 2003, Experiments 2-3). The two data sets 
we selected for modeling used this type of query, coupled 
with summary displays of contingency information in which 
individual cases are presented in a single organized display 
(see Figure 3 for an example). Such presentations provide a 
vivid  display  of  individual  cases,  making  salient  the 
frequencies of the various types of cases, while minimizing 
memory demands.  
Data Set 1: “Headache” Cover Story 
We first modeled a large data set from a study by Liljeholm 
and Cheng (2007, Experiment 1). 
 
Method    Fifty-two  undergraduates  at  the  University  of 
California,  Los  Angeles  (UCLA)  were  assigned  in  equal 
numbers  to  generative  and  preventive  conditions. 
Participants first read a cover story about a pharmaceutical 
company  investigating  whether  various  minerals  in  an 
allergy  medicine  might  produce  headache  (generative 
condition) as a side effect. The preventive cover story was 
identical except that the word “remove” was substituted for 
“produce”.  Participants  were  further  informed  that  each 
mineral  was  to  be  tested  in  a  different  lab,  and  that  the 
number of patients who had a headache before receiving any 
mineral, as well as the total number of patients, might vary 
across patient groups from different labs. Participants were then  presented  with  data  from  the  tests  of  the  allergy 
medicine.  Each trial was depicted as the face of an allergy 
patient.    As  illustrated  in  Figure  3,  each  patient  was 
represented  by  a  cartoon  face  that  was  either  frowning 
(headache) or smiling (no headache). The data were divided 
into  2  subsets,  each  an  array  of  faces.  The  top  subset 
represented  patients  before  receiving  the  mineral  and 
depicted  P(e+|c-);  the  bottom  subset  represented  patients 
after receiving the mineral and depicted P(e+|c+).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contingency conditions were varied within-subjects. Two 
samples sizes (16 and 64) were combined with two causal 
powers, .25 and 1, and three base rates: 0 (for generative; 1 
for  preventive),  .25,  and  .75,  yielding  a  total  of  24 
conditions (see Figure 4). The code in Figure 4 indicates 
number of patients with headache out of total number before 
receiving  the  mineral  (i.e.,  base  rate  of  the  effect),  and 
number with headache out of total number after receiving 
the mineral (where the mineral is C and headache is E). In 
Figure 4, generative and preventive conditions are identical 
except that the frequencies of headache and no headache are 
transposed.  For  example,  the  generative  case  0/16,  4/16, 
where the base rate P(e+|c-) = 0, P(e+|c+) = .25, power 
=  .25,  and  the  sample  size  is  16,  is  matched  to  the 
symmetrical preventive case 16/16, 12/16, where P(e+|c-) = 
1, P(e+|c+) = .75, power = .25, and the sample size is 16. 
Before  answering  the  strength  query,  participants  were 
asked  if  “The  mineral  has  absolutely  no  influence  on 
headache.”  Strength  ratings  were  not  obtained  for  those 
participants who agreed with this assertion. The subsequent 
query (generative conditions) was, “Suppose that there are 
100 people that do not have headaches. If this mineral was 
given to these 100 people, how many of them would have 
headaches?” The preventive version simply substituted “do” 
for “do  not” and “have” for “not have”. Participants had 
been instructed not to provide any numerical rating when 
selecting the first answer option, as well as to not put a zero 
rating  when  selecting  the  second  answer  option.  The 
dependent  measure  of  causal  strength  was  the  average  of 
numerical rating (1-100) elicited in each condition for the 
second query.  
 
Fits of Bayesian Models 
Predicted  mean  strength  values  can  be  derived  from 
Bayesian models under the assumption that people estimate 
strength  by  implicitly  sampling  values  drawn  at  random 
from  the  posterior  probability  distribution  over  w1  (cf. 
Mamassian  &  Landy,  1998).  Accordingly,  in  our 
simulations the mean of w1 for each contingency was used 
to  predict  the  corresponding  mean  strength  rating. 
Following Buehner et al. (2003) and Liljeholm and Cheng 
(2007), we assume that mean strength ratings on the 100-
point scale approximate a ratio scale of causal power.
1  
 
Figure 4. Strength ratings (Data Set 1). Numbers along top show 
stimulus  contingencies  for  generative  cases;  those  along  bottom 
show contingencies for matched negative cases. A: Mean human 
ratings  (error  bars  indicate  1  standard  error);  B~E:  Predictions 
from four models. 
 
Hence,  a  successful  model  must  aim  to  account  for  the 
actual  values  obtained  for  human  strength  judgments, 
without  any  further  data  transformation.  Accordingly,  we 
report model fits not only based on correlations, but also on 
root-mean-squared (RMS) deviations from the human data. 
In addition, the models with NS priors predict systematic 
interactions as a function of causal direction. For Models I 
and  III only,  we  therefore  computed  not  only  the  overall 
correlation of model predictions with human data, but also 
the  correlation  (rd)  between  the  observed  and  predicted 
difference  between  the  mean  strength  judgments  for 
matched  generative  and  preventive  contingencies.  The 
                                                            
1 The  assumption  of  a  ratio  scale  is  likely  to  break  down  for 
strength estimates near the extremes (0 or 100 on the scale) due to 
measurement  issues  (errors  necessarily  fall  one  side  of  the  true 
mean).  
 
Medicine  A
No  Medicine
When Medicine A was given  to  them,
t his is how they were:
When these pat ients were not given any
medicine, this is how t hey were:
= headache Figure 3. Example of a 
“headache”  display, 
showing  patients  who 
had  not  (top)  or  had 
(bottom)  received  a 
mineral  used  in  an 
allergy  medicine,  and 
who  had  or  had  not 
developed headaches. predicted difference score is always 0 for Models II and IV, 
which assume uniform priors; hence rd is not computable. 
The  human  data  (Figure  4A)  were  well  fit  overall  by 
Models  I  and  II based  on  the  power  generating  function, 
either with NS priors (Figure 4B) or uniform priors (Figure 
4C; r = .97 and .96, respectively). Model I (NS power) has a 
slight  advantage  in  terms  of  lower  RMS,  and  in  addition 
yields a positive correlation with the difference in strength 
ratings for matched generative and preventive contingencies 
(rd = .41). Models III and IV based on the linear generating 
function (Figure 4D-E) yielded substantially poorer overall 
fits (r = .86 for each), roughly doubling the RMS relative to 
the models based on the power generating function.  The 
reason  for  the  poor  fits  of  the  linear  models  is  that  they 
erroneously  predict  that  human  strength  judgments  will 
asymptote at values corresponding to values of ∆P, whereas 
human judgments actually approach values of causal power 
at  asymptote.  The  linear  Model  III  with  NS  priors  does, 
however, yield a positive correlation with difference scores 
for generative versus preventive causes (rd = .61). 
Data Set 2: “DNA” Cover Story 
For  generality,  we  performed  an  experiment  to  obtain 
strength ratings using a different cover story. 
 
Method  Seventy-four UCLA undergraduates served in the 
study. The cover story concerned a bio-genetics company 
testing the influence of various proteins on the expression of 
a  gene.  Participant  were  told  that,  in  each  of  several 
experiments,  DNA  strands  extracted  from  hair  samples 
would  be  exposed  to  a  particular  protein  and  that  the 
expression of the gene would then be assessed.  They were 
told  that  their  job  was  to  evaluate  the  influence  of  each 
protein on the expression of the gene.  Each participant then 
saw a series of “experiments”, each of which showed two 
samples of DNA strands, depicted as “vivid summaries” of 
the same basic sort used the “headache” study (see Figure 5).  
One  sample  of  DNA  strands  had  not  been  exposed  to  a 
particular protein, while the other sample of DNA strands 
had been exposed to that protein. The 16 contingencies used 
in the experiment are shown in Figure 6. Causal direction 
was varied between-subjects, contingency within-subjects. 
Strength judgments were obtained from all participants. 
The causal query in the generative condition was: “Suppose 
that there is a sample of 100 DNA strands and that the gene 
is OFF in all those DNA strands. If these 100 strands were 
exposed to the protein, in how many of them would the gene 
be  TURNED  ON?”  The  preventive  query  was  identical 
except that “OFF” was replaced by “ON” and “TURNED 
ON” by “TURNED OFF”.  
 
Fits of Bayesian Models 
As for the data for the “headache” cover story, the human 
data based on the “DNA” cover story (Figure 6A) was well 
fit overall by Models I and II based on the power generating 
function,  either  with  NS  (Figure  6B)  or  uniform  priors 
(Figure 6C; r = .98 for each). The RMS was very low for 
both models, with a slight advantage (less than 1 point on 
the 100-point scale) for Model II. However, Model I (NS 
power)  yielded  a  substantial  positive  correlation  with  the 
difference  in  strength  ratings  for  matched  generative  and 
preventive contingencies (rd = .80), whereas Model II with  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Strength ratings (Data Set 2). Same conventions as in 
Figure 4. 
 
uniform  priors  is  completely  unable  to  account  for  the 
pattern of interactions with causal direction. 
Once  again,  Models  III  and  IV  based  on  the  linear 
generating function (Figure 6D for NS priors, Figure 6E for 
uniform priors) yielded substantially poorer overall fits (r 
= .77 and .76, respectively), roughly quadrupling the RMS 
relative  to  the  models  based  on  the  power  generating 
Testing Protein F:
= gene ON = gene off
Legend for gene expression
No  Protein  F
Protein  F
These DNA strands were not exposed
to protein F, and this is how they were:
These DNA strands were exposed to
protein F, and this is how they were:
Figure  5.  Example  of  a 
“DNA”  display,  with 
DNA strands that had not 
(top)  or  had  (bottom) 
been  exposed  to  a 
protein,  and  indicating 
whether a gene was off or 
on. function.  Model  III  with  NS  priors  did,  however,  yield  a 
positive  correlation  with  difference  scores  for  generative 
versus preventive causes (rd = .81). 
General Discussion 
In  summary,  the  best  overall  account  of  human  strength 
judgments  for  both  the  “headache”  and  “DNA”  data  sets 
was  provided  by  the  NS  power  model  (Model  I),  which 
combines the power generating function with NS priors. NS 
priors  provide  the  only  formal  account  to  date  of 
asymmetries between causal judgments for generative and 
preventive causes. Similar asymmetries have been observed 
for  judgments  of  whether  or  not  a  causal  link  is  present 
(structure judgments; Lu et al., 2006).
2 
The quantitative failure of the linear generating function 
(Models III and IV) confirms the negative conclusion that 
has  been  reached  on  the  basis  of  more  qualitative 
comparisons (e.g., Buehner et al., 2003; Liljeholm & Cheng, 
2007; Novick & Cheng, 2004).  We thus can rule out the 
possibility  that  adopting  the  Bayesian  framework  might 
somehow  salvage  the  linear  generating  function  as  a 
psychological  model  of  human  causal  learning  (see  also 
Danks et al., 2003), regardless of whether the linear function 
is cast directly in terms of ∆P (Jenkins & Ward, 1965) or 
indirectly  in  the  Rescorla-Wagner  model  (Shanks  & 
Dickinson, 1987). 
An  important  meta-point  is  that  there  may  be  many 
potential “rational” models of a given cognitive task. The 
Bayesian  framework  simply  derives  rational  predictions 
from stated theoretical premises: if a reasoner has certain 
entering  causal  beliefs,  and  believes  that  causes  follow  a 
certain  function  in  generating  their  effects,  then  some 
pattern  of  rational  causal  judgments  follows.  The  four 
Bayesian  models  we  have  considered  here  differ  in  their 
underlying theoretical premises, and hence in their empirical 
predictions.  The  Bayesian  framework  provides  a  natural 
formalism  for  deriving  and  comparing  the  quantitative 
predictions of alternative “rational” models. 
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